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Abstract 
 
 
Except for a patina of twenty-first century modernity, in the form of logic and language, philosophy is 
exactly the same now as it ever was; it has made no progress whatsoever. We philosophers wrestle with 
the exact same problems the Pre-Socratics wrestled with. Even more outrageous than this claim, though, 
is the blatant denial of its obvious truth by many practicing philosophers. The No-Progress view is 
explored and argued for here. Its denial is diagnosed as a form of anosognosia, a mental condition where 
the affected person denies there is any problem. The theories of two eminent philosophers supporting the 
No-Progress view are also examined. The final section offers an explanation for philosophy’s inability to 
solve any philosophical problem, ever. The paper closes with some reflections on philosophy’s future. 
 
 
If we doubt, as many do, that non-scientific fields make progress, that cannot be 
because individual schools make none. Rather, it must be because there are always 
competing schools, each of which constantly questions the very foundations of the 
others. The man who argues that philosophy, for example, has made no progress 
emphasizes that there are still Aristotelians, not that Aristotelianism has failed to 
progress. 
 
Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (second edition), pp. 162-163. 
 
 
1. How Philosophy is like Science 
 
I’m a professor in a philosophy department. Most of my philosophical colleagues study ethics 
of one sort or another. We have in our department several consequentialists, a couple of 
deontologists and moral essentialists, a couple of virtue ethicists, and a few relativists. It is a 
commonplace that these views, at least in certain well-known formulations, are incompatible 
with each other. Certainly, most of my colleagues believe this. Most also believe that he or she
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is right. Since they also believe in theory-incompatibalism, they believe that their 
colleagues are wrong. The consequentialists (a group to which I do not belong) are 
particularly vociferous (no doubt just by chance). They passionately and earnestly 
explain to the rest of us that we are wrong, and they give us arguments both old and 
new to get us to change our views. We never do. 
 
This is not to say that their arguments don’t affect us. Like philosophers everywhere 
and of every stripe, we nonconsequentialists are strongly affected by our colleagues’ 
arguments for consequentialism: they cause us to draw distinctions and find false 
premises and errors in our colleagues’ reasoning. Of course, when we point these out, 
the consequentialists, like us, don’t change their minds; they muster even more resolve 
and begin afresh.  
 
Religion is also important in my department. Here matters are even more pointed, 
which is obvious from the fact that discussions about religion are far more polite than 
discussions about ethics. The theists think that the atheists are benighted, and vice 
versa. The Buddhists think both are sadly confused, and will only lose their confusion 
after many more cycles of death and rebirth. Since religions carry robust ontological 
commitments, the disagreements here about who’s right and who’s wrong are 
disagreements about the actual structure and content of the universe; they are 
disagreements about what kind of universe we live in. Arguments here are even more 
inefficacious than the ethical arguments discussed above. 
 
These two cases – ethics and religion – are local instantiations of the way philosophers 
behave and have behaved since philosophy first appeared in humankind, which is 
probably contemporaneous with the emergence of language. Philosophers strongly 
disagree with each other, arguments rarely change any philosopher’s mind (though 
sometimes arguments awaken a philosopher from his or her dogmatic slumbers), and 
they think the other is wrong and has made mistakes, rather than thinking that each 
other merely has a different take on the relevant facts.   
 
In thus behaving as they do, philosophers are acting almost exactly like scientists (and 
mathematicians). To see this, compare the situation in my department with the one 
across campus in the biology department. We have, at Binghamton University, a well-
known biologist – David Sloan Wilson – who has for decades developed and argued for 
an important addition to the current theory of evolution: group selection theory. In 
group selection theory, selection pressures act not only on individuals (or genes), but 
also on groups of similar individuals, called trait groups.  Wilson uses group selection 
to explain such things as the evolution of altruism and cooperation, for which group 
selection works quite nicely and apparently better than models based on gene selection. 
Wilson’s view is more complicated than this brief description; for example, group 
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selection is but one part of his larger theory called multilevel selection theory, which 
posits selection occurring at several different levels: gene, cell, organism, group (see, 
Sober and Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1975; Wilson and Sober, 1994; and Wilson and 
Wilson, 2008). Nevertheless, this will do for our purposes.   
 
Group selection is roundly rejected and even savagely attacked by the likes of Richard 
Dawkins and Daniel Dennett who reject it as either wrong or at best inconsequential 
(see, e.g., Dawkins, 1994, and Dennett, 2006). Group selection was banned from 
evolutionary biology back in the late 1960s mostly due to the late George Williams 
(Williams, 1972) -- the reasons are complex and sociological rather than scientific. But 
thanks to David Wilson and other biologists like him, group selection is making a 
comeback and finding a home in evolutionary theory. Dawkins and Dennett remain 
unpersuaded by Wilson’s arguments. Wilson thinks they’re wrong; they think he’s 
wrong. For every argument Wilson musters, Dawkins and Dennett gear up their 
distinction-making and fault-finding in order to refute Wilson, and vice versa. One is 
strongly reminded of the old saw “Scientific debates are won only when the combatants 
die and a new generation comes of age adopting the new theories.” If group (and 
multilevel) selection theory does eventually win, it will be because a new generation of 
biologists embraces them. 
 
It is remarkable how common this is in science. Einstein apparently went to his grave 
believing that quantum mechanics was wrong (even though he helped create it). Henri 
Poincaré, Leopold Kronecker, L. Brower, and L. Wittgenstein went to theirs believing 
that Georg Cantor’s theories of transfinite numbers were not just wrong, but “a grave 
disease,” to quote Poincaré. Though few in number, legitimate scientists to this day 
disbelieve evolutionary theory, preferring instead some sort of creation-by-intelligent-
agent(s) theory. No doubt they will go to their graves maintaining such beliefs (and vice 
versa for evolutionists).   
 
There are counterexamples, of course. Robert Bakker’s theory that dinosaurs were 
warm-blooded, fast, and smart is now (with some variation) the received view, and it 
has become the received view in his lifetime. There is an appropriate and expiating 
irony here though: Bakker refuses to accept the asteroid/comet impact theory of the 
extinction of the dinosaurs, and this despite the 2010 publication in Science of a major 
paper strongly supporting the theory (Schulte, et al. 2010). 
 
So, no one can convince one’s opponent. All one can hope to do is convince the next, 
younger generation. Good theories, better theories, do just this. This behavior even 
probably makes sense, in the long run, for if we surrendered our cherished scientific 
theories too easily, we would not be sufficiently testing and stressing our theories for 
them to be legitimately awarded the coveted honorific: True. Thus does science lurch 
forward. 
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But what of philosophy? It clearly does look a lot like science here: no one can 
convince one’s opponent, etc. etc. Does it also thus lurch forward? 
 
No, it does not. 
 
 
2. How Philosophy differs from Science 
 
Philosophy does not even stumble forward. Philosophy does not move forward at all. It 
is the exactly the same today as it was 3000 years ago; indeed, as it was from the 
beginning. What it does do is stay current; philosophers confuse this with advancing, 
with making progress. Staying current is not moving forward any more than staying up 
on the latest fashions or music is movement toward greater social justice. 
 
I know this claim of mine strikes philosophers as obviously false, crazy, and 
outrageous. I get two kinds looks. One kind is one of utter confusion, as if I’d just 
sincerely asserted, “One plus one equals three.” The other is one of disgust as if I just 
sincerely asserted, “Slavery is morally required.” 
 
“Look,” you might say, in a spirit of trying to correct someone who thinks the moon is 
made of green cheese, “we all think slavery is immoral. In fact, we know it is. How is 
that not philosophical progress? How is that not progress in ethics which is branch of 
philosophy?” 
 
I didn’t say society doesn’t progress. It does. We are now quite clear on the immorality 
of slavery. (More or less: though slavery is illegal in every country in the world, there 
are more slaves now than ever, and it is a billion dollar business). But philosophy didn’t 
discover slavery’s immorality. Philosophers weren’t leading the charge against slavery 
when it was openly and commonly practiced. What happened was that political leaders 
and social activists (who weren’t philosophers, but social activists) changed the way 
many thought about slavery to the point that attitudes changed, laws were enacted, and 
society and culture thereby changed. Philosophers had to catch up. This is true across 
the board in ethics. Except for a tiny handful of writings (Mill’s on women’s rights, for 
example; Locke on individual liberty and equal rights), philosophers were, and still are, 
not at the vanguard of any advance in morality and ethics. Philosophers didn’t discover 
and start the push for animals rights, civil rights, rights for the disabled, the 
disenfranchised, they didn’t push first, before everyone else, for increased diversity and 
respect for all humans and all life. They had to catch up to these ideas, and frankly, 
many are lagging quite far behind, still.   
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“But even so,” you might reply, “philosophers now know that slavery is wrong. That’s 
an advance, as you clearly admitted, so philosophy does advance.” 
 
Oh yeah . . . why is slavery immoral? No two philosophers will answer this the same 
way. Even within the consequentialists in my department there are several different 
explanations as to why slavery is immoral. In a deep and important sense, we don’t 
know why slavery is immoral. We just know that it is. And knowing the latter is 
something many know. Philosophy’s job—if it even has one—is to explain or say why 
slavery is immoral. And it hasn’t done that. (Why it hasn’t done that will be the topic of 
section 6.) 
 
Society doesn’t turn to its philosophers for a deeper understanding of moral and ethical 
issues. Society, when in desperate need, cannot ask its philosophers for help. “What 
should we do?” would be answered, “Well, that depends. On the one hand, you might 
consider maximizing the good (in any of several different ways, using any of several 
definitions of “the good”), but on the other hand, you might consider that certain 
actions seem to some to be intrinsically wrong and others intrinsically good. And on the 
third hand, perhaps moral relativism is true after all. It’s hard to say, really.”  
 
Here’s a relevant quote from James Sterba (2005):  
 
Ethics appears to be unlike other areas of inquiry. After all, we cannot find 
contemporary defenders of Ptolemy (c. 100-c. 170 CE), Copernicus (1473-
1543), or even Isaac Newton (1642-1727), all claiming to have the best theory 
of the physics of celestial motion. Nor are there contemporary mercantilists or 
physiocrats, as there were in the eighteenth century, all claiming to have the best 
theory of economics. But we can find contemporary defenders of Aristotle (384-
322 BCE), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), for 
example, all claiming to have the best theory of ethics. Of course, significant 
disagreements remain in other areas of inquiry, but the extent of disagreement 
appears to be much greater in ethics. 
 
Sterba has hit the nail on the head. Clearly other philosophers also see that at least some 
branches of our chosen discipline don’t make progress. The trouble with Sterba’s view, 
however, is that it stops at ethics. Metaphysics and Epistemology, and all their 
subdisciplines, suffer the exact same fate (see also, McGinn, 1993 and Nagel, 1986). 
Very unlike any science, no part of philosophy advances. Philosophy is, except for 
some modernizing, exactly the same now as it has ever been. It has not progressed one 
iota. 
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3. Aristotle Comes to the Twenty-First Century 
 
Imagine that Aristotle, as he’s walking around the Lyceum, encounters a time-warp and 
pops forward to today, on a well-known campus somewhere in some English-speaking 
country, with the ability to speak English, dressed in modern garb, and that he doesn’t 
become deranged as a result of all of this. Curious about the state of knowledge, he 
finds a physics lecture and sits in. What he hears shocks him. A feather and an iron ball 
fall at the same rate in a vacuum; being heavier doesn’t mean falling faster, something 
he doesn’t understand.  Aristotle along with the rest of the class is shown the 
experimental verification of this from the moon (from the moon?!?!?) performed by 
Commander David Scott of Apollo 15.  The very same equations (equations?!?!?) that 
explain why an apple falls to the ground explain how the moon stays in orbit around 
Earth and how Earth stays in orbit around the sun (orbits?!?!?).  He learns of quantum 
mechanics strangenesses. The more he hears, the more shocked he gets. Finally, he just 
faints away. He faints away again in cosmology class where he learns, for starters, that 
comets and meteors, and the Milky Way are not atmospheric phenomena, as he 
concluded. The Big Bang, relativity, the size of the universe, the number of galaxies, 
dark matter, and dark energy . . . are all too much for him. In biology class, he learns 
that a living thing’s potential, its matter, is not at all explanatory, as he thought, but 
instead learns of genetics and developmental biology. He also learns that his idea of 
spontaneous generation is just plain wrong—not even close to being correct. He learns 
of evolution and the discovery that all of life on Earth is related. As the class continues, 
he again faints dead away.   
 
After he comes too, he soberly concludes that this modern world, this advanced time, 
has utterly surpassed his knowledge and the knowledge of his time. He feels dwarfed 
by our epistemic sophistication. Sadly, he trundles off to a philosophy class—a 
metaphysics class, as it turns out. Here he hears the professor lecturing about essences, 
about being qua being, about the most general structures of our thinking about the 
world. He knows exactly what the professor is talking about. Aristotle raises his hand to 
discuss some errors the professor seems to have made, and some important distinctions 
that he has not drawn. As the discussion proceeds, the metaphysics professor is a bit 
taken aback but also delighted at this (older) student’s acumen and insight. Then 
Aristotle goes to an ethics class, where he learns of the current importance of what is 
apparently called “virtue ethics.” He recognizes it immediately, but again, the professor 
seems to have left out some crucial details and failed to see some deeper aspects of the 
view. Aristotle raises his hand. . . . 
 
This story of Aristotle’s return to philosophy no doubt is somewhat plausible to the 
reader (excluding, probably, the time-travel part). Perhaps it is no more than that or just 
barely that. But this is all I need. The fact that this story contains even a whiff of 
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plausibility shows that the reader can discern a crucial difference between science and 
philosophy. From our twenty-first century perspective, we see that Aristotle was not 
even in the ballpark with most of his scientific ideas, theories, and conclusions. His 
works in science are only of historical interest. But he is a giant to this day in 
philosophy. We can learn by reading his philosophical works.   
 
This pattern of ignoring old science but rereading over and over again old philosophy 
repeats throughout the histories of science and philosophy. Here’s another case. 
Consider Einstein (1879-1955), Frege (1848-1925), and Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The 
works of the latter two philosophers are read closely to this day, not only by 
accomplished, professional philosophers, but in graduate seminars where their works 
are plumbed for deep truths. Yet, no physicists read Einstein’s 1905 papers, even the 
one on Special Relativity, nor do they read his 1916 paper on General Relativity. Of 
course, both Special and General Relativity are still taught—they are regarded as the 
backbone of modern physics and cosmology. Having been tested thoroughly, Einstein’s 
theories are currently regarded as true. But it is precisely because these theories are 
regarded as true that no one reads them in their original descriptions. Instead modern 
versions with much more perspicuous mathematics are taught and used. Since his 
theories are true, what Einstein actually said needn’t be fought over. Frege’s and 
Wittgenstein’s theories and conclusions, on the other hand, are not regarded as true; 
they are regarded as interesting and important. So, of course, the originals would be 
read and examined. . . and fought over.  For example, Kripke’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein (1982) caused strong debate, with many Wittgenstein scholars decrying 
Kripke’s book and the ideas in it (e.g., McGinn, 1984; Baker and Hacker, 1984). 
 
The exact same pattern emerges with Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and John Stuart Mill 
(1806-1873). Darwin’s conclusions are regarded as true, so there’s no need to agonize 
over what he actually said. Mill’s conclusions are not regarded as true, but rather, 
interesting and important. So we do need to agonize over what he actually said. 
 
In sum, though the relevant scientific texts are old, the theories, when true, aren’t (truth 
doesn’t age). So we teach the theories, which we update with better techniques. 
However, no philosophical theory is true, or at least no theory is regarded as true by 
significant and large majority of philosophers. So, we have no recourse but to agonize 
over and rehash what the philosopher said. In the case of philosophy, the texts remain 
“new,” in the sense that they are still published and read. 
 
What could explain this pattern of vast disparity in the histories of philosophy and 
science, in what the returning Aristotle experiences? Only one thing: Philosophy 
doesn’t progress. Yes, it morphs and transforms to stay current. Our metaphysics today 
is not Aristotle’s metaphysics. Ours is populated, for example, with possible worlds, 
whose existence is bolstered by a robust and large family of logics that Aristotle 
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couldn’t have imagined. Our metaphysics contains ideas like supervenience, which is 
used to explain, among other things, the relationship between mind and brain and the 
relationship between consciousness and brain. But more importantly, our metaphysics 
is for us. It is written in our language for us to communicate our twenty-first century 
ideas in. But that’s all; that’s the extent of the “progress”. The ideas and theories are 
new or couched in modern language, but no real progress is made, none. 
 
 
4. Philosophical Anosognosia 
 
One might object that notions such as possible worlds, supervenience, and modal logic 
are definitely advances; they obviously represent progress. In fact, philosophy, across 
the board, contains many notions and concepts that are completely new and very useful. 
Aristotle didn’t have these notions, these advanced and powerful concepts with which 
to explain the mind, the universe, and everything.   
 
I must have received this objection dozens of times. What’s astonishing about this 
objection is how lame it is while at the same time being ardently believed. If all these 
new notions represent advances, where are the true philosophical theories? Where’s the 
deep and widespread agreement throughout the philosophical world about which 
theories are true? I have even been told by philosophers, as they narrow their eyes, 
furrow their brow, and get very serious, that theory X is true. The problem is, and you, 
the reader, knows this is coming, that X ranges not only over many different theories, 
but theories which are flatly incompatible. I’ve been told that Kant’s theory of ethics 
(with some fixes) is true, and then been told that Mill’s theory is (with some fixes). In 
all these cases, the theory X that I’m told is true, is the one the philosopher him- or 
herself happens to believe and work on (no surprise there). 
 
How could the obvious truth that philosophy lacks true theories, or at least lacks 
theories that are widely regarded as true, be denied? How could the obvious truth that 
philosophy never progresses be so vociferously denied? 
 
Anosognosia is a mental disability in which a person who suffers from another, primary 
disability denies that he or she does in fact suffer from the primary disability. Some 
cases of anosognosia are shocking in that the primary disability is conspicuous and 
large. For example, blind or paralyzed anosognosiacs will simply deny that they are 
blind or paralyzed. 
 
Philosophers the world over suffer from anosognosia.  Their primary disability is that 
they work in a field, a discipline, that never progresses, yet most of them get state 
money in the form of salaries. This creates cognitive dissonance and is apparently 
impossible to live with. So, they develop anosognosia and simply deny that philosophy 
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never progresses. They assert that philosophy does progress, because, after all, we now 
know that . . . wait for it  . . . theory X is true. 
 
Philosophers also suffer from other mental disabilities. They suffer from the Illusion of 
Explanatory Depth. IOED is the universal error that all of us make in believing that we 
know more about something than we actually do. Example: You probably think you 
understand zippers; try explaining how one works. Or try this with a battery (see 
Rozenblit and Keil, 2002). Philosophers (qua philosophers) suffer from a particularly 
egregious form of this epistemic error: While holding a heavily marked-up and 
annotated copy of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a modern metaphysician will hold forth 
about modern metaphysical theory X and why it is true, even while no one believes 
him. At least zippers actually work and there was a pre-zipper time—they represent 
technological progress. And, and this is the key, at least someone somewhere can 
explain zippers fully and completely. 
 
And finally, philosophers (qua philosophers) suffer from Illusory Superiority (IS), a 
cognitive bias that causes people to overestimate their positive qualities. Again, 
philosophers suffer from an extreme version of this. Philosophy is essentially 
destructive. Whatever you believe, no matter how obvious or fundamental, no matter 
who you are, or where, or when, there’s a good philosophical argument that your belief 
is false. There is no deep, foundational belief that philosophy cannot refute (not even 
Descartes’ Cogito). Most who are susceptible to IS think they are above average, but 
philosophers think they are so superior that they claim to be the direct opposite of what 
they actually are: the Vandals and Visigoths of the intellectual world. Or, better: the 
incoming, Everest-sized asteroid streaking toward all that decent people hold dear. 
 
 
5. Philosophy and the Nosognosiacs 
 
Nosognosiacs know that they suffer from some ailment or disability (“nosognosiac” is a 
term of my coinage). As we’ve seen, there are some philosophers who do know that 
philosophy never progresses, or at least are wary of claims of significant progress. Two 
of the most distinguished are Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn. Their seminal works 
on this topic are, respectively, The View From Nowhere (1986), and Problems in 
Philosophy (1993). Here, very briefly, are their theories. 
 
Nagel argues that philosophical problems are intractable because of the contradictory 
interaction of two necessary and ineluctable points of view: the objective point of view 
and the subjective point of view. For example, from the subjective point of view, we 
seem to have freewill, but from the objective point of view, we seem to lack freewill, 
and instead be causally determined like every other physical thing.  
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Science works on Nagel’s view because it is only done from the objective point of 
view. The subjective point of view though real, is ignored in science: even when 
science studies consciousness—the sine qua non of the subjective point of view—it 
studies it from the objective point of view (to no great success, obviously). The relation 
between science’s crucial property of being public and openly accessible is tightly tied 
to its being practiced only from an objective point of view. 
 
McGinn argues that philosophical problems are intractable because of the way our 
minds function. Our minds are primarily for knowing about the world. They work best 
where there they can discern some domain of primitive elements the combination of 
which gives rise to complex aggregates or structures that supervene on the primitive 
ones. The problem is that philosophical problems are not amenable to such an 
understanding. All philosophy problems are tractable in principle, just not to us. It is as 
if we asked a turtle to run the 100 meter dash in under 20 (or even under 60) seconds. 
Or we asked a chimpanzee to figure out how to combine general relativity and quantum 
mechanics in a single testable theory. 
 
Science works on McGinn’s view because the bottom-up strategy our minds prefer is 
applicable to the ordinary world: physics, chemistry, biology, and even psychology do 
seem to work this way. 
 
 
6. Philosophy: a Riot of Relativism 
 
McGinn’s and Nagel’s theories seem different, but a closer examination of them reveals 
that they are variants of the same idea.  From here, we will see that they in fact are 
contradictory.   
 
Crucial to McGinn’s view is that idea that though we cannot solve the problems of 
philosophy, they are in fact solvable, at least in principle (1993, chs. 8 and 9, esp. pp. 
128ff and 135-156.). And this isn’t mere logical possibility either; this is physical 
possibility (possible in this universe; indeed, he thinks aspects of our own brains have 
in fact solved some central philosophy of mind problems, but we cannot access said 
knowledge, pp. 135-143). Therefore, there are, in principle, a set of physically 
realizable epistemic, cognitive capacities can solve philosophy’s problems. This set of 
capacities constitutes a point of view from which philosophy’s problems can be solved. 
Humans just happen not to inhabit the right point of view, i.e., have the right cognitive 
capacities, to solve philosophy problems. Nagel’s view is directly about points of view 
shifts. Therefore, both McGinn’s and Nagel’s theories of why philosophy doesn’t 
progress are based on points of view.   
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Given this similarity, it is now easy to see that the two theories are contradictory. 
Nagel’s theory says: 
 
There are three points of view. From the subjective view, we get one set of 
answers to philosophy questions, and from the objective view, we get another, 
usually contradictory, set, and from a third view, from which one can see the 
answers of both the subjective and objective views, one can see that the 
subjective and objective answers are equally valid and equally true. Therefore, 
philosophy problems are intractable. Philosophy cannot progress because it 
cannot solve them.   
 
McGinn’s theory says: 
 
There are two relevant points of view. From one, the human view, philosophy 
problems are intractable. From the other, the alien view, philosophy problems 
are tractable (perhaps even trivial; again, see ch. 8, op. cit.). The situation here 
is exactly like the situation with dogs and English. We easily understand it. 
Dogs understand only a tiny number of words, and seem to know nothing of 
combinatorial syntax. Therefore, though it is unlikely we can solve any 
philosophy problems, they are not inherently intractable. 
 
We see then, that Nagel thinks that philosophy is inherently intractable: any humanly 
intelligent, conscious being is going to be ensnared by philosophy, provided only that it 
considers any of it. And there exists a point of view from which this truth can be seen. 
McGinn denies this. He thinks that philosophy is only locally intractable. Alien beings 
could well find philosophy problems intuitively easy to solve. There exists a point of 
view from which philosophy problems are solvable. 
 
Nagel and McGinn are of course doing metaphilosophy. Plausibly, metaphilosophy is 
philosophy. Therefore, we have here a paradigm case exhibiting the property 
philosophy has in common with science: two theorists disagreeing about their 
explanations (in this case, about why philosophy doesn’t or can’t advance). But since 
this is philosophy, we can predict that neither theory will ever win out, even in the 
minds of future generations. 
 
But wait! Isn’t this incorrect? If space aliens show up and give us the solutions to our 
philosophical problems, then McGinn will be proven right and Nagel wrong. But, 
McGinn denies that this can happen: we wouldn’t understand their solutions. Again, 
think of giving dogs our solution to making dog toys (factories, synthetic, harmless 
fibers, plastic squeakers, etc.). They wouldn’t get it, to put it mildly. And, in any case, 
the arguments are about what to believe now. Of course, we might wake up tomorrow 
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with a sudden understanding of the freewill/determinism problem. But if we ask, today, 
what that understanding would be, we’d be doing philosophy and we’d get nowhere. 
 
So Nagel and McGinn are doing philosophy, and accordingly we will never know 
which of their theories is correct, if either is. From Nagel’s point of view, the 
subjective/objective divide is unbridgeable, and is the font of all philosophy and its 
intractability. From McGinn’s point of view, there is a point of view from which the 
problems of philosophy are solvable, indeed, solved.   
 
We see from my couching the clash between Nagel’s and McGinn’s theories as a clash 
between points of view that Nagel’s point of view theory generalizes: All philosophy 
problems, and indeed, anything that seems like a philosophical advance can be rendered 
as a clash between points of view on a specific issue. From one point of view, we get 
one answer, and from another view, we get a different, usually contradictory, answer. 
Nagel’s theory restricts these points of view to subjective and objective ones, but that 
restriction can be relaxed.   
 
For an example, consider a famous case from the history of philosophy. Quite some 
time back, it was thought that all necessary truths could be known a priori. So, if a = b 
was a necessary truth, then it could be known without any investigation of the world. 
But then a posteriori true identities like water = H2O which cannot be known without 
investigating the world, must be contingently true. The notion of contingent identity 
was widely agreed to be correct, and found steady employment in the philosophy of 
mind, where it bolstered physicalism. In 1970, Saul Kripke changed all that by point 
out that contingent identities were usually nothing of the sort. Assuming that “a” and 
“b” are names of a certain kind (what Kripke called rigid designators - names that 
designate the same thing in all possible worlds), then a = b has to be necessary. 
Usually, “a” and “b” are rigid designators. So usually identities are necessary; 
contingent identity is almost vanishing rare, according to Kripke. Hence, there must be 
necessary truths, e.g., water = H2O, that can only be known a posteriori. One argument 
Kripke used to make his case against contingent identity was this. Consider your desk. 
Fans of contingent identity were fond of saying things like “The desk could have been 
made out of ice; but it is not; it is therefore contingently true that your desk is made out 
of what it is, wood, let’s say; whence there is a contingent identity here.” But, as Kripke 
pointed out, this desk (here, you point to your desk) could not have been made of ice; 
this desk is made of wood. If your desk had been made of ice, it would not have been 
this desk. By using the demonstrative “this,” Kripke was changing the point of view in 
the debate about contingent identity: he was forcing the reader to consider this very 
desk, rather than a desk considered only under the description “My desk.” The 
Kripkean point of view (K) of this very desk, focuses the reader on the desk as an object 
in and of itself, rather than the desk as falling under some description as “My desk, at 
which I sit and type.” From point of view K, the desk is perceived independently of all 
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descriptions, while from the description point of view, the desk is perceived under a 
description. Essentially, Kripke pointed out that fans of contingent identity were guilty 
of thinking only of things under a description and never as things as they were in and of 
themselves.   
 
Kripke’s point of view change had a huge impact on philosophy, but it is not a change 
between subjective and objective points of view such as required by Nagel’s theory. 
Examples such as the Kripkean one are everywhere in philosophy, and are responsible 
for much of it. We can see, then, that there are more points of view change crucial to 
philosophy than those between subjective and objective points of view. The change 
between Nagel’s and McGinn’s is another example (for more on this example, see 
Dietrich and Hardcastle, 2004, esp. chs. 3 & 4). (I should point out that as compelling 
and important as Kripke’s demolition of contingent identity was, since it was 
philosophy, contingent identity has made a comeback (see, e.g., Gibbard, 1975). To 
date, both approaches to identity are alive and kicking, naturally.) 
 
Philosophy, then, emerges as a riot of relativism. Views that are flatly contradictory are 
equally plausible. All one has to do is adopt the right point of view to see first one 
answer to a philosophy problem and then, by adopting another point view, see a 
conflicting, second answer.  
 
There is much more work to do on points of view, work that is required before the 
weirdness that is philosophy can be explained and understood. But we now know this 
much: In philosophy, clashing points of view are ineluctable, and their existence is the 
only truth. Thus philosophy cannot progress. 
 
(Points of view don’t go away when we do science. But all the relevant views belong to 
the same family, and thus belonging, cooperate, at least in the long run. It is quite hard 
to characterize this family. It is not just the family of objective points of view, though it 
is that. Public, repeatable, objective are terms that only partially characterize this 
family. I hope to have more to say about this in future.) 
 
 
7. He who understands me finally recognizes me as right . . . and wrong 
 
In 6.54 - 7 of his Tractatus, Wittgenstein says,  
 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, 
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up 
on it.)  
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What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
 
Same thing here, and I’m as silent as Wittgenstein was. My explanation of why 
philosophy does not and cannot progress (clashing points of view are ineluctable in 
philosophy) is a bit of philosophy. So, of course it will not convince the anosognosiacs. 
And it won’t even convince the nosognosiacs, like Nagel and McGinn, whose theories 
differ from mine (the union of those two sets is probably everyone but me). Nor will the 
truth of why philosophy never progresses ever be known. 
 
Eons from now, after the humans are gone, perhaps points of view will remain. Perhaps 
powerful intelligences will still exist—a sufficient condition for points of view. Perhaps 
they will exist elsewhere in the universe, perhaps we will have created our own 
descendents (Dietrich, 2007). Regardless, we can be certain of this: if points of view 
still exist, then so will philosophy—the very philosophy we are wrestling with today, 
and the very philosophy we wrestled with all those centuries ago. 
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